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Evil Bad Guys Cause Accidents?

 Most accidents originate in actions committed by
reasonable, rational individuals who were acting to
achieve an assigned task in what they perceived to be
a responsible and professional manner.
— Peter Harle, Director of Accident Prevention,Transportation Safety Board of Canada and former RCAF pilot,
'Investigation of human factors: The link to accident prevention.' In Johnston, N., McDonald, N., & Fuller, R.
(Eds.), Aviation Psychology in Practice, 1994
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Success teaches
us nothing;
only failure
teaches
Admiral Hyman G. Rickover
Father of the US Nuclear Navy
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Success and Adversity
 87 successful space shuttle flights between Challenger and Columbia
 “Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop
including reliance on past successes as a substitute for sound engineering practices …‟
- Columbia Accident Investigation Board, September 2003

 Several Technical Issues faced by the Space Shuttle Program before Columbia:
Ball-Strut-Tie Rod Assembly (BSTRA)
Main Prop System Flowliner Cracks
TVC Hydraulic Power Unit
ET Foam loss
ETA Ring Structural Margin
SRB Nozzle Pocketing
SRB Insulation Ply Lifting
SRB Nozzle Bonds
SRB Propellant Cracks
Payload Bay Door Power Drive Unit
MLP Corrosion – Hydrogen Vent Line
Orbiter Corrosion Rudder/Speedbrake
Orbiter Wiring
Transporter Bearings
Pyrotechnic Duds
Main EngineTurbine Tip Seals
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Minor Maintenance Issue – Tile Damage
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As Columbia Counted Down to Launch
 The Space Shuttle perceived as “Operational” and “a Mature System” after flying for 22 years and
112 flights
 No major surprises expected
 Environments and hardware thought to be well understood.

 NASA under intense budgetary pressure – costs must be reduced
 Annual inflation adjusted Shuttle budget reduced 45% between 1991 and 2002

 NASA under intense schedule pressure – Space Station Assembly significantly behind schedule
 Columbia mission STS-107 was considered “routine” and “low complexity”
 On Orbit repair to heat shield considered impossible “Nothing We Can Do” – an “Accepted Risk”
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Success leads to Failure
 Success can be more dangerous than failure
 Learn to ask for help early
 Keep your leaders informed
 Don’t be like the frog in the pot of water – boiled to death slowly
 Encourage your subordinates to report problems and ask for help
 Don’t punish them inadvertently – encourage ‘bad news’ reports
 Don’t punish them by over helping them

Failure really is an option – Lucy V. Kranz
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NASA’s Return to Flight Rationale
Primary
Hazard
Control

Warning
Devices

I

Elimination of Critical
Debris
II
Impact Detection During
Ascent
III
On-Orbit Debris
Impact/Damage Detection

Special
Procedures

IV
On-Orbit TPS Repair
(Tile & RCC)
V
Crew Rescue
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Elimination
of Ascent
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On-Orbit
Inspection
and Repair

Contingency
Shuttle Crew
Survival
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Change

Fixes for Aging
Orbiter Issues
Identified
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Post Columbia
 Several Senior (retired) NASA officials involved in Space Shuttle Development gave us two areas
to avoid:
 On Orbit Tile Repair will never work – we tried everything 20 years ago and nothing worked
 Do not change the outer mold line of the shuttle stack – the aerodynamics are too hard to get right

 In Return to Flight we were forced to do both
 On Orbit Tile and RCC repair materials and techniques developed and validated
 Ice-Frost-Ramp reduced, Protuberance-Air-Load ramp removed, wind tunnel campaign verified aero loads
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Addressing the Culture
 NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe emphatically instructed all employees to “Accept the
[CAIB] Report”
 Posters all over the agency asked “Have you read the report?”

 Independent Review Teams (ASAP, RTFTG, others) met almost continuously to ensure
the Space Shuttle Program rigorously completed all requirements for return to flight
 Program Management power curbed with checks and balances from Independent
Technical Authorities
 Behavior Sciences Technology company hired to retrain NASA managers
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Safety and Management Changes
 Mission Management Team (MMT)
 Significant changes to the composition and focus of the MMT
 Formal training requirements established
 Now a well-functioning real-time management body
 New MMT room designed to facilitate open communication
 Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA)
 Reinvigorated independent S&MA at HQ and Centers
 Strengthened Shuttle Program S&MA and Systems Engineering and Integration capabilities
 Established Independent Technical Authority and technical warrant holders
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center
 Established at Langley as an independent
source of engineering and technical expertise
 Important resource for Space Shuttle engineering
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Management Re-Training
 Reading assignments on management culture and best practices
 “Angle of Attack” about Apollo 1 Fire
 “The Challenger Launch Decision”

 Hiring of two academic management experts to embed with the mission
management team
 Dr. Don Van Ende from Trinity University
 Dr. Chris Jones from University of Central Florida

 Multiple MMT training sessions and very specific certification
requirements
 Lectures by experts on management culture
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Dr. Diane Vaughn
Dr. Charles Perrow
Dr. Nancy Levison
Dr. Edward Tufte
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Culture Change Initiatives
 Attendance at MMT and PRCB mandatory for senior managers
(substitutes not allowed)
 Inclusion of all NASA centers in decision making emphasized
 New Mission Management Team room built
 Round Table
 Teleconferenced all meetings with all NASA Centers
 Call on all parties – not just subject matter experts – for their advice and review

 Smaller, ‘warmer’ conference rooms designed for MMT
 Behavorial Sciences Technology, Inc. Hired to observe and debrief all
Space Shuttle Program meetings
 Emphasis on drawing out ‘weak signals’
 Emphasis on non-confrontational management style
 Emphasis on civility and courtesy
SAS Approved for Release
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Management Classes Added
 Cockpit Resource Management course by Flight Safety International developed into Spaceflight
Resource Management class taught internally
 Safety Culture Training Class developed
 Lessons in writing ‘white papers’ vs. building PowerPoint presentations
 Lessons in human social interaction were instituted
 How to draw out dissenting opinions
 The valuable use of silence in meetings
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Fighting the Culture Wars
 Many ‘old line’ managers resisted the culture changes as ‘coddling’ the workforce – and wasting
time
 While some personnel transfers to S&MA were made, it was still regarded as a sideline
organization to be avoided
 Cultural Biases are hard to change

 Senior NASA HQ management agonized over the slowness of return to flight
 “Take the foam off the bipod and fly in October 2003”

 Some independent reviewers remained skeptical – hostile – to the very end
 Virtually everyone hated BST
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More Pushback
 Frequently heard comment: “The CAIB got it wrong”
 Generally heard from senior (old line) managers
 Generally regarding NASA organizational culture

 “Not invented here” syndrome continues to exacerbate inter-center relationship difficulties
 Email from a retired senior NASA executive to me in late 2015 (typical of many received):
“The general thrust of the questions give me some concern. The strong emphasis seems to be

targeted toward "Organizational Culture". The principal thought appears to be correcting a culture where
young engineers at a low organizational level could not exercise proper influence.
I am not aware of any organizational cultural flaw of this nature having any effect on the Shuttle Program
Management's lack of attention to foam shedding from the tank. What am I missing?
The so called organizational cultural flaw attributed to the Challenger accident is a very different issue.
The o-ring discussion between a contractor and MSFC that occurred prior to the Challenger launch has
no relationship to Columbia that I am aware of.
Are we chasing ghosts invented by the CAIB?”
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Embrace Dissent
“If we are all in agreement on the decision – then I propose we postpone
further discussion of this matter until our next meeting to give ourselves
time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some understanding of
that the decision is all about”
– Charles E. Wilson, CEO of General Motors, 1950

Listen to weak signals and poor arguments for the truth they hold but are having difficulty
communicating.
Tip: Appoint a ‘devil’s advocate’ to make the argument on the other side when all appear to be in
agreement.
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Afraid to Ask for Help
 Sometimes people are afraid to ask for help because they might get more help than they want. Or
at least more management attention than they want.
 Many times our team members want to be the ‘hero’ that saves the program – the one that works
all day and all night and gets the vehicle to flight no matter what
 More often than not, those ‘heroes’ are unsuccessful, and the issues come out very late – when
resources could have been provided to help solve them earlier
 One Project Manager: “Don’t worry Boss, we have it under control. I’ll let you know when to
worry.” Me: “That makes me worry more than ever”
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Trying to break out of the mold
 Commercial Crew and Commercial Cargo programs are an attempt to lighten NASA
control and allow for innovation and flexibility – and lower cost
 Shuttle had 40,000 specifications and requirements, Constellation had (estimated) over
100,000 specifications and requirements, Commercial Crew has about 10,000
specifications and requirements
 NASA trying to relinquish control in areas where the technology is more mature and
private companies can be motivated to adequately provide safety and reliability at lower
cost
 Results are open, human spaceflight certification is pending.
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http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/469245main_GovernmentInsightForCommercialCrewTransportation.
pdf
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Fifteen Years On – What Has Changed
 Anecdotal evidence that emphasis on safety has eroded
 Alternatively, emphasis on process and ‘safety’ have increased cost and delayed schedule
critically on new NASA programs
 Balance is needed

 Anecdotal evidence that old management styles have crept back in
 Not looking for dissenting opinions
 More concerned with schedule and cost than risk

 Some changes have devolved into ‘checking the square’
 “No dissenting opinions” frequent statement on management briefings
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NASA as a High Reliability Organization
 Preoccupied with [the Possibility of] Failure
 A Learning Organization
 Internal Lessons Documented, Studied
 Lessons from Others Gleaned and Studied

 Reluctant to Simplify Interpretations
 Sensitive to Operations
 Committed to Resilience
 Redundancy or “defense in depth”

 Deferential to Expertise
 Management defers to Engineering defers to “hands-on” personnel
SAS Approved for Release
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Ten Enduring Lessons












It can happen to you.
Focus.
Speak up.
You are not nearly as smart as you think you are.
Dissention has tremendous value.
Question the Conventional Wisdom
Do good work.
Engineering is done with numbers
Use your imagination
Nothing worthwhile was accomplished without taking risk.
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